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Improved Truthful Mechanisms for Subadditive
Combinatorial Auctions: Breaking the Logarithmic Barrier
Sepehr Assadi∗ Thomas Kesselheim† Sahil Singla‡
Abstract
We present a computationally-efficient truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with
subadditive bidders that achieves an O((loglogm)3)-approximation to the maximum welfare in
expectation using O(n) demand queries; here m and n are the number of items and bidders,
respectively. This breaks the longstanding logarithmic barrier for the problem dating back to
the O(logm · loglogm)-approximation mechanism of Dobzinski from 2007. Along the way, we
also improve and considerably simplify the state-of-the-art mechanisms for submodular bidders.
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1 Introduction
In a combinatorial auction, m items inM are to be allocated to n bidders in N who have valuations
for bundles of items. Each bidder i ∈ N has a valuation function vi : : 2M → R+ that describes
their value vi(S) for any bundle S of items. The goal is to design a mechanism that finds an
allocation A = (A1, . . . , An) of the items to the bidders so as to maximize the social welfare defined
as Welfare(A) :=
∑
i∈N vi(Ai). We need the mechanisms to be computationally efficient in that they
run in poly(m,n) time given proper query access to the valuations of bidders, namely, value queries
and demand queries (see §2 for definitions). Mechanisms should also take into account the strategic
behavior of the bidders. A mechanism in which the dominant strategy of each bidder is to reveal
their true valuation in response to given queries is called truthful. For randomized mechanisms, we
consider universally truthful mechanisms which are simply distributions over truthful mechanisms.
A central question of Algorithmic Mechanism Design is to understand the inherent clash between
computational-efficiency and truthfulness for combinatorial auctions (see, e.g. [DNS06, ABDR12,
FKV17, MN08, DV11, Dob07, Dob16a, AS19, AKSW20]). On one hand, the celebrated VCG
mechanism of Vickrey, Clarke, and Groves [Vic61, Cla71, G+73] is a truthful mechanism that returns
the welfare maximizing allocation but requires exponential time for most classes of valuations.
On the other hand, constant factor approximation algorithms exist for many interesting classes of
valuations, but they are not truthful. Are there mechanisms that are both computationally efficient
and truthful while still matching the performance of these algorithms?
A particularly interesting case of this question is when the bidders’ valuations are subadditive1.
This captures the property that items are not complementary in that they will not become more
valuable together than apart, a natural and important property in many contexts. Moreover, sub-
additive valuations encompass various other valuation classes of interest as special cases, e.g., XOS,
submodular, and gross substitute valuations (see [LLN06] for definitions and significance of these
classes in the context of combinatorial auctions). Finding a welfare maximizing allocation with sub-
additive bidders is not possible in polynomial time [DNS05], and thus VCG is not a computationally
efficient mechanism for this problem. However, from a purely algorithmic perspective, there is a
poly-time 2-approximation algorithm for subadditive combinatorial auctions due to Feige [Fei06],
improving upon the O( logmloglogm) approximation algorithm of Dobzinski et.al. [DNS05].
The state-of-the-art truthful and computationally efficient mechanisms for subadditive com-
binatorial auctions are lagging considerably behind. The first such mechanism was obtained by
Dobzinski, Nisan, and Schapira and achieves an O(
√
m)-approximation [DNS05]. This was soon
after improved by Dobzinski in [Dob07] to an O(logm loglogm) approximation. Breaking this log-
arithmic barrier however has remained elusive for way over a decade now. In the meantime, the
special case of this problem with submodular (and even XOS) valuations has witnessed tremendous
progress: a long line of work in [DNS06, Dob07, KV12, Dob16a, AS19] culminated in an O(
√
logm)-
approximation mechanism of Dobzinski [Dob16a] that finally broke this logarithmic barrier, and was
subsequently improved by the first and the last authors to an O((loglogm)3)-approximation [AS19].
These results fall short of addressing subadditive valuations due to the known Θ(logm)-gap for ap-
proximating subadditive valuations via XOS valuations2. Indeed, to quote [Dob16a]: “A logarithmic
factor loss seems inevitable with this approach [i.e., combining [Dob07] with [Dob16a] (and [AS19]
also)]. Breaking the logarithmic barrier also for subadditive valuations looks challenging”.
1A valuation v(·) is subadditive if for all A,B ⊆M , we have v(A ∪B) ≤ v(A) + v(B).
2A valuation v′(·) γ-approximates another valuation v(·) if for all S ⊆ M , we have v(S) ≤ v′(S) ≤ γ · v(S).
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Our Result. We present a new mechanism that breaks the logarithmic barrier on the approxi-
mation ratio of subadditive combinatorial auctions, all the way to a polyloglog(m) factor.
Main Result. There exists a universally truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with
subadditive bidders that achieves an O((loglogm)3)-approximation to the social welfare in
expectation using at most n value and demand queries.
Our result matches the state-of-the-art for the special case of submodular (and XOS) valua-
tions [AS19] and unifies the previous two lines of work on subadditive and submodular valuations.
Furthermore, our approach considerably simplifies the previously best mechanism of [AS19], and
improves it from O((loglogm)3)-approximation to O((loglogm)2)-approximation (Theorem 2).
Our Techniques. Our starting point is the prior work on the existence of “good” prices for XOS
(hence also for submodular) [FGL15, Dob07] and subadditive valuations [DKL20]; these prices are
such that a fixed-price auction (FPA) on these prices results in an O(1)-approximation of welfare
for XOS and O(loglogm)-approximation for subadditive bidders. The catch with these prices is
that one needs prior knowledge of the (probability distributions of the) valuations, which we cannot
assume. The goal in all truthful mechanisms in this line of work [DNS06, Dob07, KV12, Dob16a,
AS19] is therefore to obtain “some estimates” on these prices and then allocate items using a FPA
with these estimates. This is similarly the case for our mechanism.
For now, let us assume that these good prices belong to the set {1, 2, 4, 8, . . . ,poly(m)} of
O(logm) different prices; this assumption captures the essence of the problem and can be removed
using standard ideas. To find a price for every item, our mechanism narrows down the choice of
candidate prices for each item in multiple rounds. In particular, in each of these rounds, either the
upper or the lower half of all candidate prices for an item are eliminated similar to a binary search.
We do this by picking for each item, the price right in the middle of its remaining candidate prices,
and then running one FPA on all items but involving only a subset of bidders. This FPA should
mostly be seen as a “practice run”. For all items that are sold, we eliminate the lower half of the
prices, and for the remaining items, we eliminate the upper half. After O(loglogm) rounds, only
one price remains per item, which is then used in the last round’s FPA. There is one further caveat
though: Any FPA to narrow down the set of candidate prices is not necessarily a practice run. With
a certain probability, they determine already the final allocation. This is necessary to compensate
that the mechanism may not necessarily be able to “learn” the correct prices. By ensuring that
each bidder takes part in only one of these FPAs, the mechanism is immediately truthful because
no bidder can actually influence their own price menu.
Our mechanism can be considered as a simplified version of the price-learning mechanism
in [AS19], which involved using multiple prices for an item in each round to learn the final prices.
Our analysis approach, however, is entirely different from the one in [AS19]. It is significantly
simpler while also improving the approximation guarantee for XOS bidders. But more importantly,
it allows us to work with the prices guaranteed for subadditive valuations in [DKL20], which are
“less robust” than the ones for XOS valuations3.
3For instance, XOS prices have the property that even if only a subset of items are assigned their correct prices,
a FPA results in a welfare at least as large as the prices of these correctly-priced items. Such a guarantee is crucially
used in [AS19] as not all prices can be learned correctly and thus one needs to be able to consider only the items
with correctly learned prices. However, subadditive prices from [DKL20] do not necessarily satisfy this guarantee.
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The analysis in [AS19] tracks the progress of the mechanism in every round. It is shown that
in each round, the mechanism can either refine the learned prices significantly for most items
(“Learnable”), or the intermediate FPAs already give a high-welfare allocation (“Allocatable”).
Thus, one way or another, the mechanism guarantees a sufficiently large welfare. Unfortunately,
maintaining such a guarantee for the case of subadditive bidders does not seem possible due to the
different nature of prices for XOS versus subadditive valuations.
Our new analysis gives no guarantee for any particular round. Instead, we lower-bound the
the expected utility of each bidder plus the revenue obtained from selling the optimal items for
this bidder in the final outcome (not necessarily to this bidder)—it is easy to see that sum of this
quantity for all bidders lower-bounds the welfare. At the same time, we show that this quantity
is not much less than the optimal welfare contribution of this bidder. To this end, we trace every
item individually through the rounds. Effectively, one of these cases has to take place: Maybe the
item reaches its intended final price, which means it will contribute in the last round’s FPA. Or
maybe the intended price gets eliminated in some round, which means that the item is either not
sold at a smaller price, or it is sold at a higher price than the intended one. If the item is not sold
at a smaller price, we argue that the bidder who gets this item in the optimal allocation could buy
it in the respective round (bidders are assigned to different rounds randomly). If the item is sold
at a higher price, we argue that we obtain enough revenue from the item. Due to subadditivity, we
are able to combine the contribution of all these different rounds and conclude the analysis.
Further Related Work. The question that whether or not computationally efficient and truthful
mechanisms can match the performance of algorithms has been studied extensively in the litera-
ture. For mechanisms that only use value queries, the answer is no: algorithms that use only
poly(m,n) many value queries can only achieve an mΩ(1)-approximation [PSS08, Dob11, DV11,
DV12, DV12, DSS15] even for submodular valuations, while O(1)-approximation algorithms are
known for these valuations [LLN06, Von08, FV06]. However, these impossibility results no longer
apply to mechanisms that are allowed other types of queries, in particular, demand queries. This has
led the researchers to study the communication complexity of this problem that capture arbitrary
queries [Nis00, BN02, DNS05, NS06, DV13, DNO14, Dob16b, Ass17, BMW18, EFN+19, AKSW20].
The only known separation between communication complexity of truthful mechanism vs. arbitrary
algorithms was very recently established in [AKSW20], building on a characterization of truthful
mechanisms in [Dob16b] (see also [BMW18, EFN+19] for earlier attempts based on [Dob16b]).
2 Preliminaries
Notation. We denote by N the set of n bidders and by M the set of m items. We use bold-face
letters to denote vectors of prices and capital letters for allocations. For a price vector p and a set
of items M ′ ⊆ M , we define p(M ′) := ∑e∈M ′ pe. Let (S⋆1 , . . . , S⋆n) denote the optimal allocation
that maximizes the welfare. Note that this allocation partitions the items M .
2.1 Subadditive Valuation Functions
We make the standard assumption that valuation vi of each bidder i is normalized, i.e., vi(∅) = 0,
and is monotone, i.e., vi(S) ≤ vi(T ) for every S ⊆ T ⊆ M . We are interested in the case when
bidders valuations are subadditive and hence capture the notion of “complement free” valuations.
A valuation v is subadditive if v(S ∪ T ) ≤ v(S) + v(T ) for any S, T ⊆M .
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Query access to valuations. Since valuations have size exponential inm, a common assumption
is that valuations are specified via certain queries instead, in particular, value queries and demand
queries. A value query to valuation v on bundle S reveals the value of v(S). A demand query
specifies a price vector p on items and the answer is the “most demanded” bundle under this
pricing, i.e., a bundle S ∈ argmaxS′{v(S′)− p(S′)}.
2.2 Good Prices for Subadditive Bidders
Our mechanism crucially uses the following prices of [DKL20].
Lemma 2.1 ([DKL20]). Given any set of items U ⊆ M and valuation v : 2M → R+, there is a
distribution λ over item sets S ⊆ U and prices q⋆ ∈ R|U |≥0 such that for any T ⊆ U , we have∑
S⊆U
λS
(
v(S \ T )− q⋆(S)
)
≥ 1
α
· v(U)− q⋆(T ).
Here, if valuation v is subadditive then α = O(loglogm) and if v is XOS then α = O(1).
The primary challenge in using the prices of [DKL20] is that they may not be robust to losing a
fraction of items. Indeed, our mechanism can at best hope to learn prices of only a fraction of the
items, but Lemma 2.1 loses additively for any such lost items.
2.3 A Fixed-Price Auction
We use a standard fixed-price auction as a subroutine in our mechanism. For an ordered set N of
bidders, M of items, and a price vector p, define FixedPriceAuction(N,M,p) as follows.
FixedPriceAuction(N,M,p)
1. Iterate over the bidders i of the ordered set N in the given order:
(a) Allocate Ai ∈ argmaxS⊆M{vi(S)− p(S)} to bidder i and update M ←M \Ai.
2. Return the allocation A = (A1, . . . , An).
It is easy to see that FixedPriceAuction can be implemented using one demand query per
bidder. Its truthfulness is also easy to check as bidders have no influence on the pricing mechanism.
Utility and revenue. For a FixedPriceAuction, we denote the utility of any bidder i ∈ N by
Utilityi := vi(Ai)− p(Ai). For any set S ⊆ M of items, we denote the revenue obtained by selling
items in S by Rev(S) :=
∑
e∈S pe · 1e is allocated. This implies that the total welfare
∑
i∈N vi(Ai) of
a FixedPriceAuction equals
∑
i∈N Utilityi + Rev(M).
3 The Binary-Search Mechanism
In this section, we design our mechanism under the assumption that we have a rough estimate
of the scale of valuation functions. Formally, let us assume that we are given an estimate ψ for
the value maxi vi(M). Simply asking the bidders for this value would lead to complex incentive
issues, but the assumption can be removed using common sampling techniques from algorithmic
mechanism design, which we give in §5 for completeness.
The idea of our mechanism is to find a good price for every item. The knowledge of ψ helps
in the following way. Observe that pricing an item above ψ will be unreasonable since no bidder
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would be willing to buy it. At the same time, items that are only bought if they have a “tiny” value
compared to ψ are not important for social welfare. Such considerations lead to the observation
that we can restrict our attention to a small set B of O(logm) candidate prices (Observation 3.1).
Based on this set of candidate prices, we design our binary-search mechanism in §3.2. For every
item, we run a binary-search procedure of log2|B| = O(loglogm) rounds. In each round, half of
the candidate prices are eliminated, which leaves us with a unique price for each item in the end.
3.1 Existence of Good Candidate Prices
As a first step, we observe that given ψ it is enough to restrict our attention to a small number of
candidate prices. More precisely, we derive a set of O(logm) prices, which are good in the sense
that Lemma 2.1 still applies approximately if we restrict to these prices. The reason is that neither
very high nor very low prices are important, and that it is okay to round prices to powers of 2. The
following observation follows easily from Lemma 2.1.
Observation 3.1. For a given ψ, define B := {0, 2−3⌈log2 m⌉ψ, 21−3⌈log2 m⌉ψ, . . . , 2−1ψ} to be a set
of 3⌈log2m⌉ candidate prices. Now for any set of items U ⊆M and any bidder i ∈ N , if vi(U) ≤ ψ
then there exist a distribution λ over item sets S ⊆ U and prices q ∈ B|U | such that for any T ⊆ U ,∑
S⊆U
λS
(
vi(S \ T )− q(S)
)
≥ 1
α
· vi(U)− 2q(T )− ψ
m2
.
Here, if valuation vi is subadditive then α = O(loglogm) and if vi is XOS then α = O(1).
Note that the statement requires ψ to be at least vi(U). If ψ is in the order of vi(U), then the
negative term ψ
m2
gets negligible. The higher ψ becomes, the weaker is the bound.
Proof of Observation 3.1. We obtain qe by rounding q
⋆
e from Lemma 2.1 to the next smaller number
in B. Note that this is always possible because 0 is contained in B. We can assume without loss of
generality that q⋆e ≤ vi(U) ≤ ψ for all e that are contained in a set S in the support of λ because
otherwise vi(S\T )−q(S) < vi(U)−vi(U) = 0 for any set T . This would mean that the contribution
of S to sum is always negative and one could shift the probability mass to the empty set. Overall,
this means that for all relevant e, we have qe ≤ q⋆e ≤ 2qe + ψm3 .
By the property due to Lemma 2.1,∑
S⊆U
λS
(
vi(S \ T )− q(S)
)
≥
∑
S⊆U
λS
(
vi(S \ T )− q⋆(S)
)
≥ 1
α
· vi(U)− q⋆(T ) ≥ 1
α
· vi(U)− 2q(T )− |U | ψ
m3
.
The claim follows because |U | ≤ m.
3.2 Binary Search on the Candidate Prices
The mechanism takes ψ as input, that is, the (estimated) value of maxi vi(M). Based on this,
it computes the set of candidate prices B as described in Observation 3.14. It then determines a
single price from B for each item within β = log2|B| rounds. This is done akin to binary search.
So in each of the β rounds every item eliminates half of its candidate prices until it gets a unique
price. This price is used for a fixed-price auction in the round β + 1.
4We assume that |B| is a power of 2, by adding arbitrary numbers to B until reaching the closest power of 2.
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To perform the binary search, we partition the ordered set of bidders N into β + 1 groups
N1, . . . , Nβ+1. In round ℓ ∈ [β], for each item e, let b(ℓ)e denote the ordered vector of remaining
|B|/2ℓ−1 candidate prices. Let p(ℓ)e be the price exactly in the middle. We now try these prices in a
fixed-price auction on the bidders in Nℓ. The outcome of this fixed-price auction is used to update
the prices, that is, to determine b
(ℓ+1)
e for all e. In particular, if one of the bidders in Nℓ buys e,
we define b
(ℓ+1)
e to only contain prices from b
(ℓ)
e that are at least p
(ℓ)
e . Otherwise, it only contain
prices that are less than p
(ℓ)
e .
While the above procedure might reach the correct price of an item, it can also end up with
completely wrong prices. However, as we show, if we choose a random one of the β+1 fixed-prices
auctions for the final allocation, the expected social welfare is sufficiently large.
BinarySearchMechanism(N,M,ψ)
1. Let B = {0, 2−3⌈log2 m⌉ψ, 21−3⌈log2 m⌉ψ, . . . , 2−1ψ}.
2. Initialize b
(1)
e for all e ∈M to contain all elements of B ordered increasingly.
3. For every i ∈ N draw ri independently uniformly from [β + 1], where ri denotes the
round in which bidder i participates. For any ℓ ∈ [β + 1], let Nℓ := {i | ri = ℓ} in
the same order as N .
4. Select a uniformly random final allocation round r⋆ ∈ [β + 1].
5. For ℓ = 1 to β rounds:
(a) For every item e, define the price p
(ℓ)
e = b
(ℓ)
e,k/2+1, where k = |B|/2ℓ−1 and b
(ℓ)
e =
(b
(ℓ)
e,1, . . . , b
(ℓ)
e,k) is the vector of candidate prices for e;
(b) Run FixedPriceAuction(Nℓ,M,p
(ℓ)) and let A(ℓ) be the allocation;
(c) For every item e, if e is allocated in A(ℓ), define remaining candidate prices
b
(ℓ+1)
e = (b
(ℓ)
e,k/2+1, . . . , b
(ℓ)
e,k), and otherwise define b
(ℓ+1)
e = (b
(ℓ)
e,1, . . . , b
(ℓ)
e,k/2);
(d) If r⋆ = ℓ then return A(ℓ) as the final allocation.
6. Run FixedPriceAuction(Nβ+1,M,p
(β+1)), where p
(β+1)
e in p(β+1) is the unique price
in b
(β+1)
e , and return this as the final allocation.
We remark that BinarySearchMechanism can be implemented using one demand query per
bidder. Its truthfulness is also easy to check as bidders have no influence on their prices since they
appear in at most one FixedPriceAuction. The following theorem is our main technical result.
Theorem 1. For a combinatorial auction with n subadditive bidders and m items, given ψ ≥
maxi vi(M), BinarySearchMechanism is universally truthful, uses at most n demand queries and
polynomial time, and has expected welfare
E[Welfare] ≥ 1
2 · α · (β + 1)2
∑
i
vi(S
⋆
i )−
ψ
m
,
where α = O(loglogm) for subadditive and α = O(1) for XOS valuations, and β = O(loglogm).
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In §5, we will show that ψ can be assumed to be order maxi vi(M) without loss of generality,
which, together with Theorem 1, immediately implies the desired O((loglogm)3)-approximation for
subadditive and O((loglogm)2)-approximation for XOS (and submodular) valuations.
4 The Analysis
The proof of Theorem 1 will follow from the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1. Consider any bidder i ∈ N and the case that ψ ≥ vi(S⋆i ). Let r−i denote a
vector containing ri′ for all i
′ 6= i. Then, for any choices of r−i we have
Er⋆,ri [Utilityi + Rev(S
⋆
i ) | r−i] ≥
1
2 · α · (β + 1)2 vi(S
⋆
i )−
ψ
m2
,
where Utility and Rev are defined for the FixedPriceAuction corresponding to the final allocation.
The proposition lower bounds for any bidder i the sum of their utility and the revenue generated
from items in S⋆i . Before proving it, let us finish the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. Note that Proposition 4.1 holds for any fixed r−i. So, in particular, we can
also take the expectation over r−i to bound the unconditional expectation by
E
[
Utilityi + Rev(S
⋆
i )
]
= Er−iEr⋆,ri
[
Utilityi + Rev(S
⋆
i )
∣∣∣ r−i
]
≥ 1
2 · α · (β + 1)2 vi(S
⋆
i )−
ψ
m2
.
Since the item sets S⋆i are pairwise disjoint and because welfare equals total utility plus total
revenue, we get
Welfare =
∑
i
(Utilityi + Rev(S
⋆
i )) ≥
∑
i:S⋆
i
6=∅
(Utilityi + Rev(S
⋆
i )) ,
where we use non-negativity of utilities. So, in combination, by linearity of expectation, we get
E[Welfare] ≥
∑
i:S⋆
i
6=∅
E
[
Utilityi + Rev(S
⋆
i )
]
≥
∑
i:S⋆
i
6=∅
(
1
2 · α · (β + 1)2 vi(S
⋆
i )−
ψ
m2
)
≥ 1
2 · α · (β + 1)2
∑
i
vi(S
⋆
i )−
ψ
m
,
where last inequality is because there are at most m choices of i for which S⋆i 6= ∅.
Proof of Proposition 4.1. For e ∈ S⋆i , let qe denote the item prices given in Observation 3.1, which
we think of as the correct price for e.
Let us observe what happens when we run the BinarySearchMechanism on all bidders except
bidder i. Recall that we have already conditioned on arbitrary values of r−i. Further, if we condition
on r⋆, there is no more randomness in the decisions of BinarySearchMechanism(N \ {i},M,ψ).
For every item e ∈ S⋆i , there are three possible scenarios depending on what happens to e in
the execution of BinarySearchMechanism(N \ {i},M,ψ), where we imagine running all the rounds
even after the final allocation (alternately, think of what happens to e for r⋆ = β + 1).
(a) p
(β+1)
e = qe. That is, item e is eventually offered at the correct price.
(b) p
(β+1)
e > qe. That is, there is a level ℓ ∈ [β] for which e is allocated in Aℓ although p(ℓ)e > qe.
(c) p
(β+1)
e < qe. That is, there is a level ℓ ∈ [β] for which e is not allocated in Aℓ although p(ℓ)e ≤ qe.
We partition the items S⋆i based on which scenario takes place as follows.
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Let C ⊆ S⋆i denote the set for which Scenario (a) takes place, i.e., these items are eventually
correctly priced with p
(β+1)
e = qe. Among them, let D ⊆ C be the items that are sold before the
arrival of bidder i in FixedPriceAuction(Nβ+1,M,p
(β+1)), assuming ri = β + 1.
For the remaining items S⋆i \ C, we partition them based on these scenarios and at which level
the first “incorrect” event happened. Let Oℓ ⊆ S⋆i denote the set of oversold items which are sold at
a higher price in Scenario (b), where ℓ is the smallest number such that e is allocated in Aℓ although
p
(ℓ)
e > qe. Analogously, let Uℓ ⊆ S⋆i denote the set of undersold items e that in Scenario (c) in level
ℓ. Note that all of the above sets are disjoint and their union is S⋆i , i.e., S
⋆
i = ·∪βℓ=1(Uℓ ·∪Oℓ) ·∪ C.
The general structure of the proof is as follows. Let T = ·∪βℓ=1Oℓ ·∪D denote the items that are
sold on some level at a sufficiently high price. So, we will use their contribution to the revenue.
For the remaining items in S⋆i \ T in contrast, we will argue that bidder i could buy them at some
point (depending on randomness ri and r
⋆). So, we will use their contribution to bidder i’s utility.
We first lower bound the expected revenue E[Rev(S⋆i )].
Claim 4.2. For any choice of r−i, we have
Er⋆,ri [Rev(S
⋆
i ) | r−i] ≥
1
(β + 1)2
· q(T ) .
Proof. We will lower-bound the revenue for all possible values of ri and r
⋆. If ri 6= β + 1, we use
the trivial bound of Rev(S⋆i ) = 0.
Next, if ri = β + 1 and r
⋆ = ℓ for any ℓ < β + 1, we know that that Aℓ is the final allocation.
Moreover, the set Oℓ defined in BinarySearchMechanism(N \ {i},M,ψ) remains the same even in
the actual mechanism BinarySearchMechanism(N,M,ψ), as in the latter, bidder i “appears” after
round ℓ. In this allocation, each item e ∈ Oℓ is sold at a price of at least qe. So Rev(S⋆i ) ≥ q(Oℓ).
Finally, if ri = β+1 = r
⋆, the allocation is Aβ+1. Here, each item e ∈ D is sold at a price at least
qe, the same way in BinarySearchMechanism(N \ {i},M,ψ) and BinarySearchMechanism(N,M,ψ),
as in the latter, bidder i “appears” after the items in D are sold. So Rev(S⋆i ) ≥ q(D).
Since every combination of ri and r
⋆ happens with probability 1
(β+1)2
, we have
Er⋆,ri [Rev(S
⋆
i ) | r−i] ≥
1
(β + 1)2
( β∑
ℓ=1
q(Oℓ) + q(D)
)
=
1
(β + 1)2
· q(T ) ,
where the last equality uses that T is defined to be ·∪βℓ=1Oℓ ·∪D.
Next we lower bound bidder i’s utility for an arbitrary set S ⊆ S⋆i (the reason we bound this
for all subsets of S⋆i and not only S
⋆
i itself is because the prices in Observation 3.1 and Lemma 2.1
are accompanied by a distribution λ which may put different masses on different subsets of S⋆i ).
Claim 4.3. For any choice of r−i, and any arbitrary set S ⊆ S⋆i , we have
Er⋆,ri [Utilityi | r−i] ≥
1
(β + 1)2
·
(
vi(S \ T )− q(S \ T )
)
.
Proof. To lower-bound the LHS, we will again consider all possible choices of ri and r
⋆. First note
that if ri 6= r⋆, then Utilityi = 0 because bidder i does not get any items in the final allocation.
Next, consider the case where ri = r
⋆ = ℓ < β + 1. In this case, bidder i can purchase items in
the set Uℓ ∩S by paying price at most q(Uℓ ∩S) since these items are not sold in this round in the
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absence of bidder i. Thus, in this case, the utility is lower-bounded by
Utilityi ≥ vi(Uℓ ∩ S)− q(Uℓ ∩ S) .
Now consider the case where ri = β + 1 = r
⋆. Since bidder i can purchase items in the set
(C \D) ∩ S by paying prices at most q((C \D) ∩ S), the utility is this case is at least
Utilityi ≥ vi((C \D) ∩ S)− q((C \D) ∩ S) .
Any combination of ri and r
⋆ happens with probability 1(β+1)2 . Therefore, we get
Er⋆,ri [Utilityi | r−i] ≥
1
(β + 1)2
( β∑
ℓ=1
vi(Uℓ ∩ S) + vi((C ∩ S) \D)− q((C ∩ S) \D)−
β∑
ℓ=1
q(Uℓ ∩ S)
)
≥ 1
(β + 1)2
(
vi(S \ T )− q(S \ T )
)
,
where the last inequality uses subadditivity of vi and that S
⋆
i = ·∪βℓ=1(Uℓ ·∪Oℓ) ·∪ C.
Since Utilityi ≥ 0 pointwise, we have Er⋆,ri [Utilityi | r−i] ≥ 12Er⋆,ri [Utilityi | r−i] and so an
immediate implication of Claim 4.3 is that Er⋆,ri [Utilityi | r−i] ≥ 12·(β+1)2
(
vi(S \ T ) − q(S \ T )
)
.
Combining this with Claim 4.2, we can lower bound the expected sum of revenue and utility by
Er⋆,ri [Utilityi + Rev(S
⋆
i ) | r−i] ≥
1
2 · (β + 1)2
(
vi(S \ T )− q(S \ T )
)
+
q(T )
(β + 1)2
, (1)
for an arbitrary subset of items S ⊆ S⋆i . Finally, we use Observation 3.1 to get∑
S⊆S⋆
i
λS
(
vi(S \ T )− q(S \ T )
)
≥
∑
S⊆S⋆
i
λS
(
vi(S \ T )− q(S)
)
≥ 1
α
· vi(S⋆i )− 2 · q(T )−
ψ
m2
.
Combining this with Eq. (1) and using
∑
S⊆S⋆
i
λS ≤ 1, we get
Er⋆,ri [Utilityi + Rev(S
⋆
i ) | r−i] ≥
1
2 · (β + 1)2
∑
S⊆S⋆
i
λS
(
vi(S \ T )− q(S \ T )
)
+
q(T )
(β + 1)2
≥ 1
2 · (β + 1)2 ·
(
1
α
· vi(S⋆i )− 2 · q(T )−
ψ
m2
)
+
q(T )
(β + 1)2
≥ 1
2 · (β + 1)2 ·
1
α
· vi(S⋆i )−
ψ
m2
,
which completes the proof of this proposition.
5 Removing the Extra Assumption
We now remove the assumption on the knowledge of an upper bound ψ for maxi∈N vi(M) and obtain
our final mechanism. Simply asking the bidders for this value would lead to complex incentive issues,
and thus, we instead apply a common sampling approach [DNS06, Dob07, Dob16a, AS19].
Theorem 2. There is a universally truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with at most n
demand and value queries and polynomial time that achieves an O((loglogm)3)-approximation for
subadditive and O((loglogm)2)-approximation for XOS (and submodular) bidders, in expectation.
Proof. The mechanism is as follows. We first independently add each bidder to the set Nsecond price
with probability 12 . Then, we run a second-price auction, in which the grand bundle as a whole is
assigned to the bidder in Nsecond price whose valuation vi(M) is highest (using value queries). With
probability 12 , this is the final allocation. Otherwise, we let ψ := maxi∈Nsecond price vi(M), and run
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BinarySearchMechanism(N \Nsecond price,M,ψ) and allocate the items to bidders inN \Nsecond price
accordingly. This mechanism is universally truthful and uses for each bidder only one demand or
value query and polynomial time. Thus, it only remains to analyze its approximation ratio.
Let imax be a bidder i whose valuation for the grand bundle vi(M) is maximum. In the following,
we condition on imax ∈ Nsecond price, which happens with probability 12 . If imax 6∈ Nsecond price, we
use that the social welfare is non-negative.
Due to our conditioning, the social welfare obtained in the second-price auction is always
maxi vi(M) = vimax(M). Besides, we always have ψ = maxi vi(M). Therefore, by Theorem 1,
the expected social welfare obtained by BinarySearchMechanism(N \Nsecond price,M,ψ) for a fixed
Nsecond price (which contains imax) is at least∑
i∈N\Nsecond price
1
2 · α · (β + 1)2 · vi(S
⋆
i )−
ψ
m
=
∑
i∈N\Nsecond price
1
2 · α · (β + 1)2 · vi(S
⋆
i )−
vimax(M)
m
.
Even when conditioning on imax ∈ Nsecond price, every i 6= imax is contained in Nsecond price with
probability 12 . Therefore, taking the conditional expectation over Nsecond price, we get the following
lower bound on the expected social welfare obtained by BinarySearchMechanism:
1
4 · α · (β + 1)2
∑
i∈N\{imax}
vi(S
⋆
i )−
vimax(M)
m
.
Finally, the second-price auction and BinarySearchMechanism are each run with probability 12 .
So, still conditioning on imax ∈ Nsecond price, the expected welfare of the final mechanism is at least
1
2
vimax(M) +
1
2

 1
4 · α · (β + 1)2
∑
i∈N\{imax}
vi(S
⋆
i )−
vimax(M)
m

 ≥ 1
8 · α · (β + 1)2
∑
i∈N
vi(S
⋆
i ) .
As imax ∈ Nsecond price with probability 12 , the expected welfare of the mechanism is at least half
the above bound. As β = O(loglogm) and α = O(loglogm) for subadditive and α = O(1) for XOS
bidders, we obtain the final bound in the theorem.
6 Concluding Remarks and Open Problems
We gave a computationally-efficient and universally truthful mechanism for subadditive combi-
natorial auctions that achieves an O((loglogm)3)-approximation in expectation. This breaks the
longstanding logarithmic barrier on the approximation ratio of such mechanisms for subadditive
bidders dating back to the O(logm · loglogm) approximation mechanism of [Dob07]. Along the
way, we also considerably simplified the previously best mechanism of [AS19] for submodular (and
XOS) bidders, and improved its approximation ratio from O((loglogm)3) to O((loglogm)2).
The obvious question left open by our work is whether our bounds can be improved further.
The limit of the recent “price learning” approaches for this problem on submodular or subadditive
bidders in [Dob16a, AS19] and our work seems to be an Ω(loglogm) approximation; it is an inter-
esting open question if we can improve our mechanisms to match this limit. However, the most
fascinating open question in this line of work is to improve the approximation factor all the way
down to a constant or alternatively prove that this is not possible. At this point, we do not even
have a lower bound that rule out such possibility for deterministic mechanisms even though the best
deterministic mechanism for this problem only achieves an O(
√
m) approximation [DNS06]. Thus,
improving the lower bound techniques for this problem is another very interesting open question.
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